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D URING the survey period the Texas courts decided a number of cases
that raised important issues concerning partnerships, limited partner-
ships, and corporations. There were also many significant developments,
both state and federal, in the law of securities regulation. These cases and
developments are discussed in this Article.
I. PARTNERSHIPS
Elements of Partnerships and Joint Ventures. The Texas courts are fre-
quently asked to decide whether two or more persons are or are not co-
partners or joint venturers. Section 6 of the Texas Uniform Partnership
Act (TUPA)' defines a "partnership" as "an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." 2 Because the gov-
erning definition is broad, and because important consequences attach to
the conclusion that persons are partners, it is hardly surprising that there is
a great deal of litigation to determine whether particular business relation-
ships constitute partnerships.
In deciding whether a partnership has been created, a Texas court
should be guided by the rules set out in section 7 of the TUPA.3 Section 7
stresses the critical importance of profit-sharing. Except in enumerated
circumstances, "[tihe receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a busi-
ness is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business."4 On the
other hand, section 7 says nothing about the sharing of losses. Profit-shar-
ing is an essential element of business co-ownership, and thus of partner-
ship,5 but loss-sharing is not.6
Because a "joint venture" is simply a partnership formed for a limited
*B.S., Stanford University; J.D., University of California at Berkeley. Professor of
Law, University of Texas.
1. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970).
2. Id § 6(1).
3. Id § 7 (rules for determining the existence of a partnership).
4. Id § 7(4). No such inference is to be drawn when the profits of a business are
received in the following circumstances: (1) as payment of a debt; (2) as wages of an em-
ployee or rent to a landlord; (3) as an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased
partner; (4) as interest on a loan; or (5) as consideration for the sale of the goodwill of a
business or other property by installments or otherwise. Id
5. A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP §§ 14(a)-(b) (1968).
6. See id § 14(e). One of the usual consequences of a finding that a partnership exists
is that each partner will be required to contribute toward the losses of the business, but the
partners may agree to allocate the losses among themselves as they wish. Id; see TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 18(l) (Vernon 1964).
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purpose,7 section 7 of the TUPA provides an appropriate mode of analysis
for determining the existence of a joint venture. However, Texas courts
seldom refer to section 7 when deciding whether particular persons are
joint venturers. More often, they invoke a four-part formula that sets forth
the following as the "essential elements" of a joint venture: (1) a commu-
nity of interest in the venture, (2) an agreement to share profits, (3) an
agreement to share losses, and (4) a mutual right of control or manage-
ment of the enterprise.8 The Texas Supreme Court reiterated and applied
this formula in Coastal Plains Development Corp. v. Micrea, Inc.9
Micrea, Inc. brought suit against Coastal Plains Development Corpora-
tion for breach of a contract concerning the development and sale of sub-
division lots. Under the contract, Coastal Plains was to subdivide and plat
a tract that it owned and have roads built on it, while Micrea was to con-
duct a promotion campaign and sell the lots. The parties agreed that all
contracts pertaining to the development were to be approved and executed
jointly, and that the net profits were to be divided equally. They also
agreed that the performance of their respective obligations would not con-
stitute them partners or joint venturers.' 0 In its action against Coastal
Plains, Micrea argued that the two companies had been engaged in a joint
venture despite the contrary expression of intent in their contract. " The
Texas Supreme Court, however, rejected Micrea's argument. The court
found that the contract between the parties "did not have any agreement
for sharing the losses,"' 2 and insisted that such an agreement is an essen-
tial element of a joint venture.13
In Micrea the court appears to have asked the wrong question, and then
to have given the wrong answer to the question it asked. An express agree-
ment to share losses should not be regarded as an essential element of a
joint venture.' 4 Because they are likely to be optimistic about the pros-
pects of their business, co-partners and joint venturers may overlook the
possibility that their enterprise will prove unsuccessful, and therefore neg-
lect to provide for the allocation of losses.' 5 In any event, Micrea and
Coastal Plains had expressly provided for the allocation of losses, or unre-
covered costs: Coastal Plains was to bear the ultimate burden of them.' 6
In its decision the supreme court emphasized that Coastal Plains was
7. See generally A. BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 35; 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS PRACTICE:
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4 (1973).
8. See, e.g., Chandler v. Herndon, 450 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
9. 572 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1978).
10. Id. at 286-87.
1I. Micrea contended that the contractual provisions requiring an equal division of the
profits and joint approval and execution of all contracts, along with certain advertising ma-
terial that stated that the project was a joint venture between the parties, established the
existence of a joint venture. Id at 288.
12. Id
13. Id
14. A. BROMBERG, supra note 5, § 35.
15. Id. § 14(e).
16. 572 S.W.2d at 288.
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solely responsible for the costs of road construction, and was obliged to
reimburse Micrea for the costs of advertising and selling, but these facts do
not lead to the conclusion that the parties were not joint venturers. Rather,
the parties had entered into a specific agreement respecting the allocation
of costs, or losses, as permitted by the TUPA.
17
Perhaps the court's reluctance to find that the parties in Micrea were
joint venturers simply reflected a policy of strict enforcement of the Real
Estate License Act (RELA), s which prohibits suits for compensation for
enumerated kinds of services by a person or company not duly licensed as
a real estate broker or salesman.' 9 The Beaumont court of civil appeals
had held that Micrea and Coastal Plains were joint venturers, so that
Micrea did not have to prove that it was a licensed broker in order to
recover damages for Coastal Plains' breach of contract, because a person
or company need not have a license to sell his or its own land.2" The lower
court may or may not have been correct in concluding that transactions
between joint venturers are exempt from the requirements of the RELA.
If the supreme court disapproved of the lower court's construction of the
RELA, however, it should have reversed on that ground, instead of hold-
ing that an agreement to share losses is an essential element of a joint
venture.
The Micrea decision was cited and followed in Raybourn v. Lewis."1
Raybourn brought suit against Lewis and others for breach of an oral con-
tract under which Raybourn had acted as a real estate advisor to the de-
fendants. According to Raybourn, the contract provided that he was to
receive a fixed salary plus ten percent of the profits earned from the par-
ties' purchase, development, and sale of real estate. The court of civil ap-
peals affirmed a judgment for the defendants on the ground that the
provisions of the RELA precluded Raybourn, who did not hold a license
to sell real estate, from recovering any compensation for his services.22 In
17. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 18(1) (Vernon 1970). Although
§ 18(1) permits the allocation of costs or losses as between partners, id § 15 provides that all
partners are jointly and severally liable for all partnership obligations. Thus, even though a
partnership agreement between A and B allocates all costs to A, B may still be held liable
for those costs to third parties. Of course, B can compel the partnership or .4 to reimburse
him pursuant to the partnership agreement.
18. Id art. 6573a (Vernon 1969).
19. In 1975 the regular session of the 64th Legislature substantially amended the
RELA. See 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 216, § 20, at 549. The Micrea case was governed by
the predecessor of § 20(a) of the amended RELA. Section 20(a), which is substantially the
same as its predecessor, provides as follows:
A person may not bring or maintain an action for the collection of compensa-
tion for the performance in this state of an act set forth in Section 2 of this Act
without alleging and proving that the person performing the brokerage serv-
ices was a duly licensed real estate broker or salesman at the time the alleged
services were commenced, or was a duly licensed attorney at law in this state
or in any other state.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
20. Coastal Plains Dev. Corp. v. Micrea, Inc., 553 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1977), rev'd, 572 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1978).
21. 567 S.W.2d 908, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. Id at 912.
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answer to Raybourn's argument that he had been engaged in a partnership
or joint venture with the defendants, the court cited Micrea and listed the
four "essential elements" of a joint venture.2 3 While the court acknowl-
edged that there was some evidence of an intent to share profits, it stressed
that there was no evidence of an agreement to share losses,24 and noted
that there had been testimony that control was solely in the defendants.25
On this record, the court bluntly concluded that "[tihere is no evidence
whatsoever establishing a joint venture or partnership. 26
The pre-Micrea decision of Heinrich v. Wharton County Livestock, Inc.27
also listed an "agreement to share losses, costs or expenses" as one of the
four essential elements of a joint venture.28 Nevertheless, without refer-
ring to any evidence of a loss-sharing agreement between the parties in the
case before it, the court concluded that they were joint venturers.29 Under
a "working agreement," Truchard was to purchase, pasture, and care for
some cattle, while Heinrich was to provide the funds necessary to pay for
the cattle. When the cattle were sold, the profits were to be divided equally
between the parties. In furtherance of the venture, Truchard purchased
some cattle at an auction with a series of drafts, and promptly resold the
cattle to Heinrich. However, the drafts given by Truchard were dishon-
ored, and the auction company repossessed the cattle. Heinrich then sued
the auction company to recover the value of the cattle. In a well-reasoned
opinion, the court affirmed a judgment for the auction company.
Truchard had known that his drafts would be dishonored when he bought
the cattle from the auction company and when he resold them to Heinrich.
Because Truchard and Heinrich were joint venturers, Truchard's knowl-
edge was imputed to Heinrich, and Heinrich could not claim the status of a
bona fide purchaser.3°
While some Texas courts invoke a questionable formula to determine
whether a partnership or joint venture has been created, other courts fail to
make clear just what legal standards they apply. For example, in Nueces
Trust Co. v. White31 one of the central issues was whether a person who
had used an automobile as security for a loan, and had delivered the own-
ership papers for the automobile to the lender, was a partner in the com-
pany that was the registered owner of the car. The court acknowledged
that there was a conflict in the testimony as to whether the borrower was a
partner in the company or had authority to use the car as collateral, but
ultimately treated the questions as issues of fact that had been resolved by
23. Id at 911; see text accompanying note 8 supra.
24. Id
25. Id A mutual right of control is one of the essential elements of a joint venture. See
text accompanying note 8 supra.
26. 567 S.W.2d at 912.
27. 557 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
28. Id at 833.
29. Id
30. Id at 834.
31. 564 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
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the trial judge.32 An award of damages against the lending institution for
the wrongful withholding of the ownership papers was affirmed.
During the survey period there was one case in which the Texas
Supreme Court relied in part on the provisions of section 7 of the TUPA
3 3
in concluding that no partnership had been created. In Rankin v.
Naftais34 the plaintiffs sought to impress a constructive trust on an oil and
gas lease that Rankin had taken in his own name. Rankin and the plain-
tiffs had jointly engaged in the business of operating the "Melton" oil and
gas lease. After the completion of the first well on the Melton lease,
Rankin bought another lease, the "Orsak" lease, with his own funds. A
well on the Orsak lease proved to be a producer, and the plaintiffs sought
to share in its production. The plaintiffs based their claim to an interest in
the Orsak lease and well on the theory that Rankin had violated his fiduci-
ary duties to them as joint venturers when he acquired the lease for his
own benefit. The court held, however, that the fiduciary duties that
Rankin owed to the plaintiffs extended only to dealings within the scope of
their joint venture, which embraced only the development of the original
Melton lease.35 The court also rejected the argument that the plaintiffs
and Rankin had entered into "a broader partnership arrangement.,, 36 The
plaintiffs had proved no more than the type of arrangement described in
section 7(5) of the TUPA, which provides that "[olperation of a mineral
property under a joint operating agreement does not of itself establish a
partnership.
' 37
Arbitration Agreements. In Wydel Associates v. Thermasol, Ltd.3 8 a fed-
eral district court was called upon to decide the operative scope of TUPA
section 9(3)(e),3 9 which no prior case had construed.4° Wydel Associates, a
Texas partnership, sued a Delaware corporation for breach of contract and
deceptive trade practices. The contract upon which the suit was brought
provided that all disputes relating to the contract were to be decided by
arbitration in the State of New York. The plaintiff partnership argued that
it was not bound by the arbitration clause because the contract containing
it had been executed by a single partner, while section 9(3)(e) requires the
unanimous authorization of the partners to "submit a partnership claim or
liability to arbitration or reference."'', The court assumed, for purposes of
argument, that section 9(3)(e) limits the authority of partners to agree to
32. Id at 806,
33. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 7 (Vernon 1970).
34. 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977).
35. Id at 944.
36. Id. at 945.
37. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 7(5) (Vernon 1970).
38. 452 F. Supp. 739 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
39. TEX. REV, Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 9(3)(e) (Vernon 1970). This section pro-
vides as follows: "Unless authorized by the other partners or unless they have abandoned
the business, one or more but less than all the partners have no authority to . . .[s]ubmit a
partnership claim or liability to arbitration or reference."
40. 452 F. Supp. at 739, 741, 742.
41. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 9(3)(e) (Vernon 1970).
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arbitrate future disputes,42 but nevertheless concluded that the partnership
was bound by the arbitration clause.43 First, the court held that the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act," which validates arbitration provisions in contracts
concerning transactions involving interstate commerce, 45 overcame the ef-
fect of section 9(3)(e). 46 The court reasoned that in cases covered by the
federal act, it was not "bound to apply those state statutes which limit
arbitration agreements with rules not applicable to other contracts. '47 Sec-
ond, the court held that the plaintiff partnership had ratified the entire
contract, including the arbitration clause, by accepting benefits under the
contract and bringing suit upon it.4
8
Dissolution and Its Consequences. Two cases decided during the survey
period dealt with questions regarding the rights and duties that arise upon
the withdrawal of a partner from a partnership. Pursuant to section 29 of
the TUPA,49 which defines a dissolution as "the change in the relation of
the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying
on as distinguished from the winding up of the business,"5 the actual
withdrawal of a partner causes a technical "dissolution" of a partnership.
A dissolution of a partnership, however, does not necessarily entail a ter-
mination of the business. The partnership agreement may provide that
some or all of the remaining partners will have the right to continue the
business after a dissolution.5' In addition, when a dissolution is caused in
contravention of the partnership agreement, the TUPA permits all the
partners who were not responsible for the dissolution to continue the busi-
ness under specified conditions.52 Even if the business is to terminate, the
partnership will continue to exist until the "winding up" of its affairs has
been completed.53
42. 452 F. Supp. at 741-42.
43. Id
44. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
45. Id § 2. This section provides as follows:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereaf-
ter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
46. 452 F. Supp. at 742.
47. Id See Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 1972).
48. 452 F. Supp. at 742.
49. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 29 (Vernon 1970).
50. Id.
51. 19 R. HAMILTON, supra note 7, § 188.
52. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 38(2)(b) (Vernon 1970). This section al-
lows the nonresponsible partners to possess partnership property for purposes of carrying on
the business as long as they secure payment by a bond approved by the court, or pay any
party causing the dissolution the value of his interest in the partnership at the time of disso-
lution less damages for the breach of the agreement, and indemnify the dissolution-causing
party against all present and future partnership liabilities.
53. Id §§ 29-30.
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Woodruff v. Bryant54 involved a determination of whether and when a
particular partnership had been dissolved. At one time the plaintiffs and
Lillie Bryant were all partners in the Flour Bluff Finance Company, which
was managed by Bryant. In 1971, a dispute arose between Bryant and the
other partners, and she wrote them a letter in which she tendered her resig-
nation as company manager and offered to sell her partnership interest.
The other partners did not respond to the letter. Bryant left her employ-
ment with the company, but continued to receive her share of the partner-
ship profits. In 1972 Bryant became the manager of a competing loan
company. The other partners in Flour Bluff sued Bryant for breach of her
fiduciary duty to refrain from engaging in a competing business, and she
cross-claimed for her share of the partnership assets. The jury found that
Bryant had intended to dissolve the partnership on the date of her letter to
the other partners, and that she had ceased to be associated with the part-
nership prior to her association with its competitor. The trial court then
entered judgment against the plaintiffs on their cause of action, and for
Bryant on her cross-claim.
The court of civil appeals held that there was insufficient evidence to
support the critical findings of the jury.55 While recognizing that any part-
ner has the power to dissolve a partnership at any time,56 the court noted
that Bryant had participated in the partnership business to the same extent
as the other "silent partners" after her resignation as manager, and that she
had still considered herself a partner at the time of trial.57 The case was
remanded for a reconsideration of whether Bryant had breached her
fiduciary duties by her employment with the competing business, and for a
redetermination of the value of her partnership interest at the date of the
actual dissolution of the finance company. 58
Ordway-Saunders Co. v. Little59 illustrates the value of including in a
partnership agreement a carefully drafted section defining the rights of a
withdrawing partner. The agreement in this case provided that when a
partner withdrew from the partnership, his interest in "the assets, records,
business and all other property" 6° of the partnership would become the
property of the partnership, and that he would receive in exchange for his
interest the amount of his capital account, as reflected on the books of the
54. 558 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
55. Id at 542.
56. The court stated that the TUPA "codifies the common law rule so that every partner
has the inherent power to dissolve his partnership even though the partnership agreement
might attempt to limit that partner's right to dissolve the partnership." Id at 539 (emphasis
added).
57. Since its inception, the partnership had had a managing partner and two or three
silent partners who participated by voting only when management decisions were necessary.
The managing partner testified that he did not discuss partnership business with any of the
silent partners during the period in question. Also, Bryant testified at trial that she was still
a partner of Flour Bluff Finance Co. and had not sold her partnership interest. Id at 541.
58. Id at 544.
59. 568 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
60. Id. at 713.
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partnership, plus his allocable share of profits and salary.6 When the
plaintiff withdrew from the partnership, he received a payment which he
regarded as insufficient, and brought suit for an additional sum. The
plaintiff conceded that the amount that he had been paid was correct ac-
cording to the partnership books, but he insisted that his capital account
was understated because it reflected only the cost and not the market value
of certain assets and included no allowance for the value of good will. The
Amarillo court of civil appeals held that the partnership agreement was
unambiguous, and that the partnership's accounting procedures were con-
sistent with generally accepted accounting principles.62 The plaintiff had
received the full payment to which he was entitled under the agreement,
and he could not thereafter demand a greater amount from the partner-
ship.63
Procedure in Suits By or Against Partnerships. In Hammonds v. Holmes
64
the Texas Supreme Court held that a judgment of dismissal with prejudice
in a suit by two individuals for wrongful foreclosure of a deed of trust on
their business property precluded a subsequent action against the same de-
fendant by a partnership comprised of the same two individuals to redress
the same wrong. Two weeks after the Hammonds opinion was issued, it
was cited as dispositive of the question in Corsicana Ready Mix v. Trinity
Metroplex Division, General Portland, Inc. 6 5 The Corsicana Ready Mix
case held that a default judgment could not be entered against a partner-
ship when each of the individual partners had filed an answer to the peti-
tion naming the partnership as defendant.66 The court reasoned that
"[slince res judicata bars a suit in the partnership name after the individual
partners' suit on the same claim had been dismissed with prejudice, it logi-
cally follows that an answer for all of the individual partners is equivalent
to an answer for the partnership. '67 Both of these decisions, refusing to
elevate form over substance, seem entirely correct. Despite the outcome in
Corsicana Ready Mix, however, a careful practitioner should file pleadings
on behalf of the partnership itself, even though pleadings are also filed on
behalf of the individual partners, whenever a petition names the partner-
ship entity as a defendant.
II. LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
Attorney General Opinion H-1229. A major controversy concerning the
law of limited partnerships was created during the survey period by an
opinion of the Texas attorney general. The final portion of Opinion H-
1229 concluded that a corporation may not serve as the sole general part-
61. Id.
62. Id at 718.
63. Id at 719.
64. 559 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. 1977).
65. 559 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
66. Id. at 424.
67. Id.
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ner of a Texas limited partnership.6" One week after H-1229 was issued,
its final portion was withdrawn "pending reconsideration."6 9 The with-
drawal, however, did not allay all the concerns raised by the original opin-
ion. In order to assist practitioners in advising limited partnerships, five
law professors published a letter that they had sent to the attorney general
prior to the withdrawal of the last portion of H- 1229.70 The letter argued
convincingly that a corporation may indeed serve as the sole general part-
ner of a Texas limited partnership.
Opinion H- 1229 contained another unsettling portion in which the attor-
ney general read section 26 of the Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(TULPA)7I as requiring the unanimous approval of the limited partners
for any acts leading to amendment or cancellation of the limited partner-
ship certificate.7 2 If this interpretation were correct, section 26 would in-
validate provisions in a limited partnership agreement for amendment of
the certificate, or dissolution of the partnership, by a majority vote of the
limited partners. The same five professors who published their objections
to the now-withdrawn portion of H-1229 also published a detailed criti-
cism of the opinion's conclusion that section 26 establishes a unanimity
requirement.73
Defective Formation of Limited Partnerships. Two cases decided during
the survey period examined the consequences of defects in the formation
of a limited partnership. In Voudouris v. Walter E. Heller & Co.7" a credi-
tor sued the defendant on a debt incurred by a business in which the de-
fendant had allegedly become a general partner. The defendant and his
brother had entered into a limited partnership agreement under which the
defendant was to be the limited partner and his brother the general partner
in a carpet company. Neither the limited partnership agreement nor any
certificate of limited partnership was ever filed with the Texas secretary of
state.75 The defendant cosigned and later paid a promissory note to obtain
funds for the business, but he never participated in the management of the
enterprise. The limited partnership agreement recited that the defendant
was entitled to twenty percent of the profits of the business, but there was
no evidence that any profits had actually been distributed to him. Upon
discovering that his brother had not been paying the bills, the defendant
gave up his interest in the partnership and obtained his brother's agree-
68. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-1229 (1978).
69. Id. H-1229A.
70. Bromberg, Bateman, Hamilton, Lebowitz & Winship, Corporate General Partners,
16 TEX. ST. B. BULL. SECTION CORP., BANKING & Bus. L., No. 1, Sept. 1978, at 24.
71. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 26 (Vernon 1970).
72. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-1229 (1978).
73. Bromberg, Bateman, Hamilton, Lebowitz & Winship, Unanimity Requirements in
Limited Partnerships, 16 TEX. ST. B. BULL. SECTION CORP., BANKING & Bus. L., No. 2, Dec.
1978, at 3.
74. 560 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1977, no writ).
75. Persons seeking to form a limited partnership are required by statute to file with the
secretary of state a certificate that sets out specified information. See TEX. REV. Clv. STAT.
Arm. art. 6132a, § 3 (Vernon 1970).
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ment to indemnify him against liability. He also informed the creditors of
the carpet company that he had sold his interest in the company and was
no longer responsible for its debts.
In a rather disjointed opinion, the Houston court of civil appeals held
that the defendant was not liable for the obligations of the carpet com-
pany. The court ruled that the limited partnership agreement never be-
came effective because it was never filed with the secretary of state,76 but
concluded that the failure to file the agreement did not result in the forma-
tion of a general partnership. 7" The court emphasized that the brothers
had not intended to enter into a general partnership, and that the defend-
ant had not taken part in the management and control of the business.78
In addition, the court held that the defendant had "renounced the partner-
ship" immediately upon learning that the partnership agreement had not
been filed, so that section 12 of the TULPA prevented the imposition of
liability.79 The provisions of this section seem fully to support the result in
the case.
The subsequent case, Garrett v. Koepke,8° decided by the Dallas court of
civil appeals, goes substantially beyond Voudouris in protecting the osten-
sible limited partners in a defectively organized limited partnership. In
Garrett the defendants had been designated as limited partners in a lim-
ited partnership agreement, but, as in Voudouris, neither the agreement
nor any certificate of limited partnership had been filed with the secretary
of state. The plaintiffs, who had entered into a contract with the ostensible
limited partnership, argued that the failure to file the statutorily required
certificate rendered the defendants liable as general partners. The court
held, however, that since the plaintiffs "were on notice that the entity with
which they were dealing was in fact a limited partnership,"' the defend-
ants' failure to file a limited partnership certificate was "immaterial."82
Reasoning that the purpose of the filing requirement is to provide third
persons with notice of the essential features of the partnership arrange-
ment, the court concluded that the plaintiffs "were in no way prejudiced by
the failure to comply with the statute." 83 The court saw "no compelling
policy reason"84 for insisting upon "technical compliance with these notice
76. 560 S.W.2d at 206.
77. Id at 207.
78. Id at 206.
79. Id at 208. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN art. 6132a, § 12 (Vernon 1970) provides as
follows:
A person who has contributed to the capital of a business conducted by a
person or partnership erroneously believing that he has become a limited part-
ner in a limited partnership, is not, by reason of his exercise of the right of a
limited partner, a general partner with the person or in the partnership carry-
ing on the business, or bound by the obligations of such person or partnership;
provided that on ascertaining the mistake he promptly renounces his interest
m the profits of the business, or other compensation by way of income.
80. 569 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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provisions."85
It is difficult to square the holding in Garrett with the provisions of the
TULPA. Section 3(a)86 of the TULPA explicitly requires that persons de-
siring to form a limited partnership file a certificate containing designated
information in the office of the secretary of state, and section 3(b) declares
that "[a] limited partnership is formed if there has been substantial compli-
ance in good faith with the requirements of paragraph (a)."8 7 When no
limited partnership certificate has been filed, there can hardly have been
"substantial compliance" with the requirements of section 3(a), and it
would seem to follow that no limited partnership has been formed. Never-
theless, the court that decided Garrett asserted, without discussing the pro-
visions of section 3, that "the entity" with which the plaintiffs had dealt
"was in fact a limited partnership."88
The Garrett court appears to have acknowledged the existence of a "de
facto limited partnership" or a "limited partnership by estoppel," just as
other courts have occasionally granted recognition to a "de facto corpora-
tion" or "corporation by estoppel." Although the de facto and estoppel
doctrines as developed in corporate law may be highly artificial, their use
has often served the ends of fairness and justice. Many cases have held
that a plaintiff who has dealt with a business association on the under-
standing that it is a corporation, but who subsequently discovers that the
corporation was defectively formed, should not be awarded a recovery
against a shareholder who was not aware of or responsible for the defect.
Thus, even in states that have abandoned the doctrine of de facto corpora-
tions, a person who has dealt with a business association as if it were a
corporation may be estopped to deny the corporation's existence.9"
Whatever the merits of particular applications of the estoppel doctrine
in corporate law, there is less need for a similar doctrine to protect the
members of defectively organized limited partnerships. The TULPA itself
provides an escape hatch for a person who thinks that he is a limited part-
ner in a limited partnership, but then discovers that no limited partnership
certificate has been filed. The statutory scheme is relatively clear. A de
jure limited partnership is formed when there is substantial compliance in
good faith with the section 3 requirements for the execution and filing of a
85. Id In a secondary holding, the court concluded that the limited partners had not
become personally liable to the plaintiffs by taking control of the partnership business, be-
cause the debt to the plaintiffs had been incurred prior to the limited partners' exercise of
control. Id at 571. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8 (Vernon 1970). The
court noted that the limited partners' liability for obligations incurred before they became
general partners could only be satisfied out of partnership property. 569 S.W.2d at 571. See
Miller v. Doughty, 520 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 17 (Vernon 1970) (liability of incoming partner).
86. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 3(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
87. Id § 3(b) (Vernon 1970).
88. 569 S.W.2d at 570.
89. See, e.g., American Salt Co. v. Heidenheimer, 80 Tex. 344, 15 S.W. 1038 (1891). See
also 19 R. HAMILTON, supra note 7, §§ 330, 331; I. HILDEBRAND, 1 THE LAW OF TEXAS
CORPORATIONS § 185 (1942).
90. See 19 R. HAMILTON, supra note 7, §§ 330, 331.
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limited partnership certificate.9 When no certificate has been filed, sec-
tion 12 allows one who intended to become a limited partner to avoid per-
sonal liability by promptly renouncing his interest in profits or
compensation after the failure to file becomes known to him.92 The diffi-
culty with the Garrett opinion is that it ignores the statute. To grant the
privilege of limited liability to all persons who represent that they are lim-
ited partners in a limited partnership, whether or not they have filed a
limited partnership certificate, effectively negates the filing requirement
enacted by the legislature.
Breach of Fiduciary Duty. One of the remedies available to limited part-
ners against a general partner who breaches his fiduciary duties was dis-
cussed in Watson v. Limited Partners of WCKT Ltd 9 3 In Watson the
limited partners sought recovery of their capital investment, on the theory
of money had and received, from the general partner. The limited part-
ners had contributed most of the capital of the limited partnership, which
was formed to own and rent out five fourplexes. According to the findings
of the trial court, the general partner "failed to manage the affairs of the
limited partnership as a fiduciary," 94 and the plaintiffs' contributions to
capital were dissipated. The limited partnership was dissolved, a receiver
was appointed, and the fourplexes were sold at a trustee's sale. The gen-
eral partner subsequently repurchased the fourplexes for his own account.
On these facts the appellate court held that the limited partners were enti-
tled to restitution of the full amount of their contributions to the capital of
the limited partnership. 95 The court concluded that when the general part-
ner breached his fiduciary duties to the limited partners, he automatically
forfeited the money that had been advanced to him.96 The case serves as a
reminder that restitution is a recognized remedy for a violation of the du-
ties arising out of a fiduciary relationship.97
III. CORPORATIONS
Recognition or Disregard of the Corporate Entity. Cases in which the
courts were asked to "pierce the corporate veil", continued to arise during
the survey period. In Inesco, Inc. v. Sears9" the seller of a barge sought to
recover the unpaid portion of the purchase price from Inesco, the purchas-
ing corporation, Trans-Mex Leasing Company, a subsidiary of Inesco, and
Gray, the former chairman of the board and controlling shareholder of
Inesco. Gray had made the initial payments on the barge, although title
was taken in Inesco's name and later transferred to Trans-Mex. Following
91. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 3(b) (Vernon 1970).
92. Id § 12; see note 79 supra.
93. 570 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
94. Id at 181.
95. Id at 182.
96. Id. at 183.
97. Id at 182.
98. 567 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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a dispute among the corporations' shareholders, the barge was ultimately
transferred to Gray in exchange for all his stock in Inesco and Trans-Mex.
The trial court found that Gray was the alter ego of Inesco and Trans-
Mex, and held all three defendants liable for the amount owed on the
barge. The court of civil appeals affirmed on two alternative theories.
First, the court noted that there was evidence that Gray had contributed all
the funds of Inesco, that he had controlled all the financial affairs of the
corporations, that he originally had intended to acquire title to the barge in
his own name, and that he had told the other shareholders and directors
that he would pay for the barge. These facts convinced the court that Gray
had used the corporate entity of Inesco to transact his personal business,
and that he should be held liable as the alter ego of the corporation.99
Second, the court concluded that Gray should be required to pay the
plaintiffs claim because he had "denuded" Inesco of its only asset when he
had acquired title to the barge in exchange for his worthless stock.' This
alternative ground of the decision seems fully adequate to support the re-
sult: neither a corporation nor an individual will be permitted to evade
creditors by gratuitously conveying assets to another person or entity. i01
Angus Y. Air Coils, Inc. 102 also involved an action brought by a creditor
seeking to hold an individual shareholder responsible for a corporate debt.
Texas Refrigeration and Engineering Company was founded in 1958 by
the defendant, F.M. Angus. Angus and his wife and son were the sole
shareholders and directors of Texas Refrigeration; in addition, Angus
served as the president of the corporation. In 1970 the plaintiff, Air Coils,
invoiced Texas Refrigeration for some repair costs, but Angus did not pay
the bill because he thought that Air Coils had collected the amount in
question from a third party. Angus dissolved the corporation in 197 1, but
he failed to send any notice of dissolution to Air Coils, and swore in the
articles of dissolution that all liabilities of Texas Refrigeration had been
discharged or adequate provision made for their payment. The trial court
reviewed the foregoing facts, noted that Angus and his wife and son had
made loans to Texas Refrigeration without receiving any evidence of in-
debtedness from it, and concluded that Angus was individually liable to
Air Coils because he had "treated the corporation as his alter ego." 0 3
The court of civil appeals reversed. At the outset the court concluded
that, "as a matter of law," Texas Refrigeration was not the alter ego of
Angus."°4 Emphasizing that Air Coils had voluntarily contracted with
Texas Refrigeration as a corporate entity, the court found none of the "ex-
traordinary circumstances" that could justify holding a shareholder indi-
99. Id at 830. For a discussion of the alter ego doctrine, see Fagan v. LaGloria Oil &
Gas Co., 494 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
100. 567 S.W.2d at 830.
101. See World Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Bass, 160 Tex. 261, 328 S.W.2d 863 (1959).
102. 567 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
103. Id at 932.
104. Id at 933.
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vidually liable on a corporation's debt. °5 Neither the fact that the
majority of the corporation's stock was owned by one person, nor the fact
that Angus and his family had provided funds to the corporation to keep it
solvent, was regarded as a sufficient basis for piercing the corporate veil. '06
Furthermore, the court dismissed Air Coils' argument that Angus's viola-
tions of certain provisions of the Texas Business Corporation Act
(TBCA) °7 made him liable for the corporation's debts. Assuming, argu-
endo, that Angus had violated article 6.04(A)(2) °8 by failing to send a
notice of dissolution to Air Coils, and had violated article 6.06(A)(4)' 0 9 by
swearing that no debts of the corporation remained unpaid, the court nev-
ertheless concluded that "violations of these provisions of the Texas Busi-
ness Corporation Act are not grounds, in and of themselves, to disregard
the corporate entity on an alter-ego theory and to impose liability individ-
ually for a corporate debt on a former shareholder." 1
Although the Angus opinion contains a thoughtful discussion of the alter
ego doctrine, the court's discussion of the dissolution statutes and the con-
sequences of a failure to comply with them is much less satisfactory. Some
confusion results from the court's characterization of the determinative is-
sue in the case. While the question was stated to be whether violations of
certain provisions of the Texas Business Corporation Act made the corpo-
ration Angus's alter ego,"' it might have been more appropriate to ask
whether the alleged violations of the TBCA gave Air Coils an independent
basis for a suit against Angus. TBCA article 6.04(A)(2) requires that a
corporation send written notice of its intention to dissolve to "each known
creditor of and claimant against the corporation."" 2 The obvious purpose
of this statutory requirement is to afford all creditors an opportunity to
press their claims against the corporation,' 13 either before it distributes its
assets to its shareholders or within the three-year period allowed for the
prosecution of actions against the corporation after the date of dissolu-
105. The court considered "extraordinary circumstances" to include the use of a corpo-
rate entity to defraud existing creditors of shareholders, to circumvent a statute, to evade an
existing obligation, or to achieve a monopoly. 1d; see, e.g., Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 155 Tex.
179, 284 S.W.2d 340 (1955); Hanson Southwest Corp. v. Dal-Mac Constr. Co., 554 S.W.2d
712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
106. 567 S.W.2d at 933.
107. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 6.04(A)(2), .06(A)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
108. Id art. 6.04(A)(2). Article 6.04(A)(2) provides that before filing articles of dissolu-
tion, "[tihe corporation shall cause written notice by registered mail of its intention to dis-
solve to be mailed to each known creditor of and claimant against the corporation."
109. Id art. 6.06(A)(4). This article requires the articles of dissolution to state the fol-
lowing:That all debts, obligations and liabilities of the corporation have been paid or
discharged or that adequate provision has been made therefor, or. . . that all
property and assets have been applied so far as they would go to the payment
thereof in a just and equitable manner and that no property or assets remained
available for distribution among its shareholders.
110. 567 S.W.2d at 934.
Ill. Id at 933.
112. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art 6.04(A)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
113. Id art. 6.04, comment (Vernon 1956).
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tion. 4 If a creditor or claimant is not notified as required by article
6.04(A)(2), and his claim is not paid or provided for prior to the dissolu-
tion of the corporation, he might have a cause of action against the corpo-
ration's directors under TBCA article 2.41(A)(3)," 5 or against the
corporation's shareholders on the common-law theory that allows an un-
satisfied creditor of a dissolved corporation to pursue its assets into the
hands of the shareholders.' 16 The Angus opinion obliquely indicates that
"the statute of limitations and the period of corporate survival had run"
before Air Coils learned that Texas Refrigeration had ceased to exist."'
The opinion, however, does not identify the particular statute of limita-
tions to which it refers, and it is not immediately obvious which statute of
limitations should be applicable when a creditor brings suit against a
shareholder or director after discovering that the corporate debtor has
been dissolved." 8 If the statute of limitations had run on Air Coils' origi-
nal contract claim against Texas Refrigeration before Air Coils com-
menced suit against Angus, the suit against Angus should probably have
been barred. On the other hand, if Air Coils would still have had an en-
forceable claim against Texas Refrigeration but for the dissolution of the
corporation and the expiration of the three-year survival period, Air Coils
probably should have had an enforceable claim against Angus and the
other former shareholders and directors of Texas Refrigeration. In any
event, the decision left unanswered many questions concerning the liabili-
ties of the former shareholders and directors of a dissolved corporation.
The best protection against such liabilities is strict compliance with the
dissolution statutes.
During the survey period, there were some rather unusual cases in
which the issue was whether or not a corporation should be recognized as
an independent entity. In Houston Furniture Distributors, Inc. v. Bank of
Woodlake, N.A. "' the plaintiff bank brought suit against the corporate
maker of a promissory note and Edward Gibbons, a guarantor of the in-
debtedness under a pre-existing guaranty agreement, for the unpaid princi-
pal amount of the note, interest, and attorney's fees. Both the corporation
and Gibbons asserted the defense of usury. Although the defendants con-
ceded that the rate of interest that the bank had charged could legally be
114. The three-year period for the survival of remedies is established by id art. 7.12. See
also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.07 (Vernon 1962).
115. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41A(3) (Vernon 1956) provides as follows:
The directors of a corporation who vote for or assent to any distribution of
assets of a corporation to its shareholders during the liquidation of the corpo-
ration without the payment and discharge of, or making adequate provision
for, all known debts, obligations, and liabilities of the corporation shall bejointly and severally liable to the corporation for the value of such assets
which are distributed, to the extent that such debts, obligations and liabilities
of the corporation are not thereafter paid and discharged.
116. See, e.g., N. LATTIN, LATrIN ON CORPORATIONS § 185 (2d ed. 1971); Schoone,
Shareholder Liability upon Voluntary Dissolution of Corporation, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 415, 416
(1961).
117. 567 S.W.2d at 934.
118. See generally Schoone, supra note 116, at 428.
119. 562 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
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charged to a corporate borrower, they argued that the loan had actually
been made to Gibbons rather than to the corporation. In particular, the
defendants pointed out that a bank officer had suggested that the note be
executed by the corporation, even though he knew that Gibbons planned
to use the borrowed funds for an investment scheme unrelated to the cor-
poration's business. In affirming a summary judgment for the bank, the
court of civil appeals held that the foregoing facts did not constitute proof
of an "agreement, device or subterfuge to charge interest at a usurious
rate.' "2 The court noted that an earlier Texas case' 2 ' had held that "a
lender may lawfully require, as a condition to making a loan, that the loan
be made to a corporation rather than to an individual borrower, and such
a condition does not, in itself, make the transaction usurious, even though
the purpose of the requirement is to permit the lender to charge a higher
rate of interest."' 22 While the court may have reached a correct result in
the case before it, the broad rule that it cited is difficult to reconcile with
the oft-repeated warning that a corporate entity cannot be used to evade
the policy of a statute.'23
Navarro v. Collora 24 was a very unusual case. The minor children of
the decedent, Joe Collora, sought to require the defendant, Navarro, to
assign his interest in certain land to the decedent's estate. In 1962 Collora
owed Navarro, his attorney, the sum of $4,000. In exchange for Navarro's
cancellation of the $4,000 debt, Collora deeded the land in question to the
Camille Corporation, of which Navarro was the president and his minor
children the sole stockholders. At the time of the conveyance, the land was
worth approximately $23,000, and only $5,500 remained due on the origi-
nal purchase price. Three years later, Camille Corporation transferred the
land to Navarro. On these facts, the trial court instructed a verdict for the
Collora children, apparently on the ground that Navarro had acquired the
land unfairly.
The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The
appellate court recognized that "the attorney-client relationship is highly
fiduciary in nature, 1 25 and that "the attorney owes his client the highest of
good faith and honest dealing."' 26 Further, the court declared that
"[tihere is a presumption of unfairness which attaches to a transaction be-
tween an attorney and his client, and once it is shown that the attorney-
120. Id at 883.
121. American Century Mortgage Investors v. Regional Center, Ltd., 529 S.W.2d 528
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
122. 562 S.W.2d at 883.
123. See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1944) (dealing with Federal
Reserve Act); United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 220 U.S. 257, 259 (1911) (dealing with
Interstate Commerce Act).
124. 566 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978), rev'd in par, 22 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 120 (Nov. 29, 1978). The supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of civil
appeals with respect to a party whose claim was distinct from that of the Collora children.
The Collora children did not appeal to the supreme court, which therefore did not address
the issue discussed in the text.




client relationship existed at the time of the transfer of property from the
client to the attorney, the burden of proving its fairness is on the attor-
ney." ' 2 7 The court, however, did not apply the rule that it announced.
Rather, it emphasized that the transfer in question was not a transfer di-
rectly from the client to his attorney, but was instead a transfer from the
client to his attorney's family-owned corporation. 28 In the view of the
court, the jury should have determined whether the conveyance to Camille
Corporation "was in fact a transaction between the defendant and Joe M.
Collora,"' 29 either because the corporation was the defendant's alter ego,
or because the defendant had designedly used the corporation as a device
to acquire the property for himself.'3 ° In the absence of a jury finding that
the conveyance to the corporation was a transaction between the attorney
and his client, the court deemed it unnecessary to decide whether or not
the transaction was fair.'
3
'
The portion of the court's opinion summarized above is extremely puz-
zling. It is impossible to see the relevance of the fact that Joe Collora had
conveyed the property in question to the defendant's family-owned corpo-
ration rather than to the defendant himself. The critical fact was that the
defendant attorney had agreed to cancel his client's indebtedness in con-
sideration of the client's transfer of property to some person or entity spec-
ified by the defendant. There obviously was a transaction between the
attorney and his client, whether the attorney chose to give the benefit of
that transaction to himself, to a corporation, to his children, or to a person
selected at random. The Cotlora children should not have been required
to demonstrate that Camille Corporation was the defendant's alter ego, or
that other circumstances justified piercing the corporate veil. On the con-
trary, as soon as the children had proved that their father had given up his
land in exchange for his attorney's cancellation of a debt, the attorney
should have been required to prove the intrinsic fairness of the arrange-
ment.
Christopher v. General Computer Systems, Inc.'3 2 was another case
reaching a very questionable result. General Computer Systems brought
suit against Surety Industries, Inc. and Christopher, Surety's president and
sole shareholder, for the misappropriation of some funds that Surety had
collected as General's agent, but that Christopher had diverted to his per-
sonal use. Judgment was entered against Christopher for $117,000 in ac-
tual damages and $150,000 in exemplary damages. The award of
exemplary damages was predicated on the jury's findings that Christopher
and Surety had conspired to withhold maintenance funds from General
and that the conspiracy had been willful and deliberate."' On appeal,
127. Id
128. Id at 311-12.
129. Id at 312.
130. Id
131. Id
132. 560 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
133. Id at 704.
1979]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Christopher attacked the award of exemplary damages on the ground that
there was no evidence of a conspiracy, since there was no evidence that he
had combined with any other identifiable individual to commit an unlaw-
ful act. The court of civil appeals held, however, that there was ample
evidence to support the jury's findings and the award of exemplary dam-
ages. 134 While the court apparently acknowledged that it takes two or
more persons to conspire, it considered Christopher and Surety to be the
requisite two persons. According to the court, the evidence supported a
finding that Christopher, acting in his individual capacity, had conspired
with Surety, acting through Christopher as its chief executive officer, to
withhold funds from General. 35
In overruling a motion for rehearing, the majority reaffirmed its original
decision, but appeared to concede that the evidence in the case may have
been inadequate to establish a common-law conspiracy for any purpose
other than to support an award of exemplary damages. 136 Further, the
majority expressly limited its original ruling "to the peculiar circumstances
of this case and the language of the issues and accompanying definitions,
as submitted to the jury without objection."' 37 Thus, while the Christopher
decision is rather bizarre, it is unlikely to have much impact as precedent.
Authority of Officers. Texas courts are frequently asked to decide whether
or not particular acts fall within the authority of a corporate officer. In
Square 67 Development Corp. v. Red Oak State Bank,'38 the question was
whether the president of a corporation had the inherent authority to em-
ploy an attorney and initiate a suit against a bank for conversion. The
court held that "the president of a corporation is not authorized to employ
an attorney to conduct litigation for the company absent express authority
or implied authority (such as entrustment with broad powers of manage-
ment of the corporate business) set forth in the bylaws or by proper action
of the board of directors."' 39 The court also noted that, in the case before
it, the board of directors had passed a resolution that negatived any au-
thority that the president might otherwise have had to prosecute the suit in
question. ' 41
While a corporation's president has very limited implied authority
under Texas law, a case decided during the past year recognized that a
general manager has much broader powers. In WB. Dunavant & Co. P.
Southmost Growers, Inc. '4' the general manager of Southmost Growers, a
corporation that operated a cotton gin, executed a written contract under
134. Id at 705.
135. Id. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Akin argued that there can be no meeting of the
minds when only one mind exists, so that two natural persons are necessary to the existence
of a conspiracy. Id at 708.
136. Id at 709.
137. Id
138. 559 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
139. Id at 138.
140. Id.
141. 561 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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which Southmost agreed to sell a particular farmer's cotton crop to W.B.
Dunavant & Company. In fact, the farmer had not authorized Southmost
to sell his cotton, and he refused to deliver his crop to Dunavant at the
price that had been negotiated by Southmost's general manager. After
buying the cotton directly from the farmer at a higher price, Dunavant
sued Southmost for damages for breach of contract. The court held that
the general manager of Southmost had authority to bind Southmost by
contract, and rendered judgment for Dunavant. The governing rule was
stated as follows:
Where a corporation transacts its business by, through or under a gen-
eral manager, the conduct of such business by the general manager
binds the corporation, if the transaction under scrutiny is within the
scope of the corporation's business. . . .[I]n the ordinary business af-
fairs of a corporation, as a general rule, the acts of a corporation's
general manager are the acts of the corporation itself.'42
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Freeman4 3 arose out of the commission
of a fraud by the chairman of the board of directors of a bank. The board
chairman agreed to sell the plaintiff 12,500 shares of his bank stock and to
see that the plaintiff was elected to the board of directors. The plaintiff
borrowed a large sum from the bank to finance the stock purchase. The
board chairman went bankrupt, however, and failed to transfer any stock
to the plaintiff or to obtain a seat on the board for him. The plaintiff then
sued the bank for fraud in the inducement. In reversing a judgment for
the plaintiff, the court of civil appeals noted that there was no evidence
that the board of directors of the bank had ever expressly or impliedly
authorized the board chairman to contract for the sale of his personal stock
to the plaintiff or to promise the plaintiff a directorship.'" As the court
recognized, the plaintiff had been "sorely abused," ' but not by the de-
fendant bank.
Three cases decided during the survey period discussed what kinds of
facts will support a finding that a corporation has ratified an originally
unauthorized act. In Bowers Steel, Inc. v. DeBrooke'46 the president of a
corporation offered the plaintiff twenty percent of the company's stock as
consideration for his accepting employment as vice president. After the
plaintiff was terminated without having received the stock, he sued the
corporation for breach of contract. The court acknowledged that the gen-
eral powers of the president of a corporation do not ordinarily include the
right to offer one-fifth of the corporation's stock to someone as an induce-
ment to enter into an employment contract.147 Nevertheless, the court af-
firmed a judgment for the plaintiff, because the evidence supported the
finding that the corporation's directors and shareholders knew of the
142. Id. at 582.
143, 560 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
144. Id at 446.
145. Id at 447.
146. 557 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
147. Id. at 372.
19791
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
promise to the plaintiff and did nothing to repudiate it prior to the decision
to terminate him.' The case illustrates the general rule that "the direc-
tors or stockholders may ratify any act or contract of any other body or
agency of the corporation which they might have authorized in the first
instance."' 49
Jackson v. Gray 5 held that the board of directors of a bank had ratified
the dismissal of the executive vice-president by the chief executive officer.
The court recognized that a valid ratification requires knowledge by the
principal of all the relevant facts, but concluded that the record established
that the board had acted with the requisite knowledge.'' Alternatively,
the court held that the board's attempt to ratify the dismissal of the vice-
president was tantamount to his dismissal by the board itself.'52
The final case involving a question of ratification was Reece v. First State
Bank."'53 The plaintiff bank sued Reece, the vice-president of a corpora-
tion, on his "continuing guaranty for corporate indebtedness."' 54 The
bank had made a loan in return for a promissory note purportedly signed
by Reece on behalf of the corporation, but Reece's signature on the note
was forged. The corporation made several payments on the note, and took
title to some vehicles purchased with the proceeds of the loan. Finding
that the corporation had ratified the execution of the note, the court held
that the note had become a "corporate indebtedness" on which Reece was
liable as guarantor.'
55
Shareholder's Petitionfor Annual Meeting. Valley International Properties,
Inc. v. Los Campeones, Inc. '56 presented a number of interesting issues,
one of which was whether an unregistered owner of shares may seek a
court order for a shareholders' meeting. Article 2.24(B) of the TBCA' 57
authorizes a proper court, "on the application of any shareholder," to or-
der a shareholders' meeting if no annual meeting has been held within a
thirteen-month period. Los Campeones purchased a majority of the shares
of Valley International Properties (V.I.P.) at a public foreclosure sale, and
then filed a petition for a meeting under article 2.24(B). On appeal from a
judgment ordering the meeting, V.I.P. argued that Los Campeones had no
right to seek relief under article 2.24(B) because it had not registered its
stock with V.I.P. in accordance with section 8.207 of the Texas Business
and Commerce Code.' 58 The court concluded, however, that section 8.207
merely affords protection to a corporation that identifies its shareholders
148. Id at 373.
149. Id at 371-72.
150. 558 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
151. Id at 139.
152. Id
153. 566 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1978).
154. Id at 296.
155. Id at 298.
156. 568 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
157. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.24(B) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
158. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.207(a) (Vernon 1968). This subsection provides
that "[pirior to due presentment for registration of transfer of a security in registered form
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by reference to its record of ownership, and does not govern how a court is
to treat an unregistered shareholder.' 59 Further, the court reasoned that if
the legislature had intended the word "shareholder" in article 2.24(B) to
mean "shareholder of record," it would have used the phrase "shareholder
of record," as it did in other sections of the TBCA. 16' Finally, the court
found that Los Campeones had a protectable property interest that entitled
it to demand a shareholders' meeting regardless of its ability or desire to
vote. '
6
Oral Contracts for the Sale of Securities. Two cases decided during the
survey period presented questions concerning the scope and meaning of
section 8.319 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, 16 2 which estab-
lishes a statute of frauds for contracts for the sale of securities. In Kenney
v. Porter 63 the plaintiff sued for specific performance of an alleged con-
tract for the purchase and sale of stock. The plaintiff and the defendant
were the sole shareholders of the Valley Plumbing Supply Company. In
accordance with a pre-existing buy-sell agreement, the plaintiff made a
written offer to sell his shares to the defendant or, alternatively, to buy the
defendant's shares. The plaintiff alleged, and the defendant denied, that
the defendant had orally accepted the plaintiffs offer. The trial court
granted a summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that there
was no written contract, as required by section 8.319 of the Texas Business
and Commerce Code, for the sale of either party's stock. The Corpus
Christi court of civil appeals, however, reversed the judgment and re-
manded the cause for trial. After reviewing the definition of the term "se-
curity" in section 8.102(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, 164
the issuer ... may treat the registered owner as the person exclusively entitled to vote, to
receive notifications and otherwise to exercise all the rights and power of an owner." Id
159. 568 S.W.2d at 687.
160. Id; see TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.25 (Vernon 1956).
161. 568 S.W.2d at 687.
162. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. g 8.319 (Vernon 1968) provides as follows:
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless
(1) there is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought or by his authorized agent or broker sufficient to indicate that a
contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described secur-
ities at a defined or stated price; or
(2) delivery of the security has been accepted or payment has been made
but the contract is enforceable under this provision only to the extent
of such delivery or payment. ...
163. 557 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
164. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.102(a)(1) (Vernon 1968) defines a "security" as
an instrument which
(A) is issued in bearer or registered form; and
(B) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or
commonly recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a
medium for investment; and
(C) is either one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a class or
series of instruments; and
(D) evidences a share, participation or other interest in property or in an
enterprise or evidences an obligation of the issuer.
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the appellate court held that there was an issue of fact as to whether or not
the stock in Valley Plumbing fell within the definition.' 65 The decision
demonstrates that the term "security" has a much more limited and techni-
cal meaning in the Business and Commerce Code than in state and federal
securities laws. 166
The interpretation of section 8.319 was also at issue in Bowers Steel, Inc.
v. DeBrooke, 167 in which one of the questions was whether the statute ren-
dered unenforceable an oral contract of employment for which the consid-
eration was to be corporate stock.'68 The jury had found that the plaintiff
was offered stock in the defendant corporation as consideration for his ac-
ceptance of employment with the corporation. Reasoning that the plaintiff
had made "payment" for the stock when he accepted a position with the
company, the court concluded that the terms of section 8.319(2) were satis-
fied, and that the plaintiff could enforce his contract. 1
69
IV. SECURITIES REGULATION
Texas Securities Law. During the survey period the Texas courts decided
three cases that presented important questions concerning the scope and
meaning of the Texas Securities Act (TSA).' 7 ° In Searsy v. Commercial
Trading Corp. 1'' the Texas Supreme Court held that certain "naked" com-
modities options were "both investment contracts and evidence of indebt-
edness,"' 72 and thus "securities" as defined in article 581--4(A) of the
TSA.173 Since the defendants had not registered the options before selling
them to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs were allowed to rescind their purchases
and recover the consideration paid. 174 In Enntex Oil & Gas Co. v. Slate 175
the principal question was whether the defendant corporations, which
were either incorporated in or authorized to do business in Texas, could
constitutionally be required to comply with the registration and licensing
provisions of the TSA before selling interests in Texas oil and gas leases to
persons who resided in other states. Noting that "the State of Texas has a
legitimate local public interest in taking precautions that oil and gas leases
covering its lands are not the subject of fraudulent security practices," the
Texarkana court of civil appeals held that the State's regulation of the de-
165. 557 S.W.2d at 591.
166. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.102(a) (Vernon 1968) with TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4A (Vernon 1964), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(i) (1976), and 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(10) (1976).
167. 557 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ). This case is also
discussed in the text accompanying notes 14649 supra.
168. 557 S.W.2d at 374.
169. Id
170. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-1 to -39, 582-1 (Vernon 1964 & Supp.
1978-79).
171. 560 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1977).
172. Id. at 642.
173. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4A (Vernon 1964).
174. 560 S.W.2d at 642.
175. 560 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977), appeal dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 445,
58 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1978).
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fendants' activities did not violate the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution. 76 The court also concluded that a defendant that did
not engage in any sales activities, but that did manage the wells drilled by
another defendant, was a "dealer" under the TSA.17 Finally, in Simmons
v. Danco, Inc. 178 the Dallas court of civil appeals held that a private party
had "no right, as a matter of law, to applh to a court for an injunction"
against another party's alleged violation of the tender offer guidelines is-
sued by the Texas Securities Commissioner. '79 The court reasoned that a
controversy concerning the enforcement of the guidelines must be submit-
ted to the Texas Securities Board or the Texas Securities Commissioner for
an initial decision,180 because the Board and the Commissioner have pri-
mary jurisdiotion over the interpretation and enforcement of rules and reg-
ulations promulgated under article 581-28-1 of the TSA.'
8
'
Federal Securities Law. Congress made some important changes in and
additions to the federal securities laws during the survey period. The Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934182 was amended by the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, 83 which outlaws the making of certain payments
designed to influence foreign officials' 84 and requires reporting companies
to meet specified accounting standards, 8 ' and by the Domestic and For-
eign Investment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977,86 which authorizes the
Securities and Exchange Commission to require disclosures from each
beneficial owner of more than five percent of a covered class of equity
securities. 8 7 Section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933'88 was amended
twice during 1978, as Congress raised the limit on the exemptions that may
be created under the section first to $1,500,000189 and then to
$2,000,000.190 The Securities Investor Protection Act"' was also
176. 560 S.W.2d at 497.
177. Id at 498. "Dealer" is defined in TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4C (Vernon
1964) (emphasis added) to include
every person or company, other than a salesman, who engages in this state,
either for all or part of his or its time, directly or through an agent, in selling,
offering for sale or delivery or soliciting subscriptions to or orders for, or un-
dertaking to dispose of, or to invite offers for, or rendering services as an in-
vestment adviser, or dealing in any other manner in any security or securities
within this state.
In concluding that the defendant was a dealer, the court stated that the defendant "was
dealing with securities that should have been licensed and regulated under the Act." 51)0
S.W.2d at 498 (emphasis added).
178. 563 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
179. Id. at 378.
180. Id at 378-79.
181. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-28-1 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
182. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (1971 & Supps. 1972-77, 1978).
183. Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 101-104, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
184. Id § 103(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-I (Supp. 1978)).
185. Id§ 102 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. 1972-77)).
186. Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 201-204, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
187. Id. § 203 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A § 78m(g) (Supp. 1972-77)).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1976).
189. Pub. L. No. 95-283, § 18, 92 Stat. 249, 275 (1978).
190. Pub. L. No. 95-425, § 2, 92 Stat. 962 (1978).
191. Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aaa-lll(1971 &
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amended,' 92 in part to double the insurance coverage for securities and
cash left on deposit with a member broker-dealer.
193
The Securities and Exchange Commission issued a number of important
releases during the survey period. When Congress raised the limit on ex-
emptions under section 3(b) of the 1933 Act from $500,000 to
$1,500,000,194 the Commission responded by increasing the maximum
amount of securities that may be sold in a regulation A' 95 offering to
$1,500,000. 196 The Commission also expanded the availability of form
S-16, the short form for the registration of securities under the 1933 Act. 97
The Commission amended schedule 14A' 98 under the 1934 Act to require
disclosures in proxy statements of the services provided to corporations by
their principal independent accountants; 99 and, in an unusual move, the
Division of Corporation Finance published its staff instructions for the re-
view of proxy materials containing anti-takeover proposals. 2" The Com-
mission also adopted new beneficial ownership disclosure rules under the
1934 Act.20'
A new rule was added to the "140 series," and three others were
amended. The Commission adopted rule 148,202 which it modeled after
rule 144,203 in order to provide a "safe harbor" for the resale of bank-
ruptcy-related securities. Subsequently, rules 144 and 148 were amended
to increase the amount of securities that may be sold under their provi-
sions, and to permit sellers to deal directly with market makers.2°  The
Commission amended rule 146205 to require issuers to file reports of non-
public offerings under the rule,2° and to allow simplified disclosures in
offerings of $1,500,000 or less. 207 Rule 145208 was amended to permit a
person deemed to be an "underwriter" of securities acquired in a rule 145
business combination to resell the securities without limitation after hold-
ing them for two years, provided that the person is not an affiliate of the
Supp. 1978)).
192. Pub. L. No. 95-283, 92 Stat. 249 (1978).
193. Id, § 9, 92 Stat. 249, 265 (1978).
194. Pub. L. No. 95-283, § 18, 92 Stat. 249, 275 (1978); see text accompanying note 189
sup ra.
195. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.264 (1978).
196. 43 Fed. Reg. 41,383, 41,385 (1978) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.254).
197. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,672, 16,677 (1978). Form S-16 is found at 17 C.F.R. § 239.27
(1978).
198. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1978).
199. 43 Fed. Reg. 29,109, 29,111 (1978).
200. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,863 (1978).
201. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,495 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 55,751, 55,755 (1978) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-I to -7).
202. 43 Fed. Reg. 14,445, 14,449 (1978) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.148).
203. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1978).
204. 43 Fed. Reg. 43,709, 43,711 (1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 54,229, 54,230 (1978).
205. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1978).
206. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,548, 10,550 (1978).
207. 43 Fed. Reg. 41,193, 41,194.
208. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1978).
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issuer and that the issuer is a reporting company.
During 1978 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
addressed many important issues of securities regulation. One of the most
significant decisions was Great Western United Corp. v. Kid well,2 ° in
which the court held that the Idaho takeover statute was invalid because it
was pre-empted by the Williams Act, 21' and because it imposed an uncon-
stitutional burden on interstate commerce.21 2 The United States Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in the case. Another important decision was
Wilson v. First Houston Investment Corp. ,2 11 in which the Fifth Circuit
held that an aggrieved investor has an implied right of action for damages
against an investment adviser for the adviser's violation of the antifraud
provisions of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.214 The Supreme Court
has granted certiorari in a Ninth Circuit case reaching the same conclu-
sion.2 '-
During its 1977-1978 Term, the United States Supreme Court decided
only one case arising under the federal securities laws. In Securities & Ex-
change Commission v. Sloan2" 6 the Court held that the SEC lacks the stat-
utory authority to issue, on the basis of a single set of events, a series of
summary orders suspending trading in a corporation's stock for consecu-
tive ten-day periods. During its present Term, the Court may produce a
large number of securities opinions. In January 1979 the Court decided
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,217 which held that the determination of
factual issues against the defendants in an SEC injunctive proceeding
could estop the defendants from relitigating the issues before a jury in a
subsequent action for damages, and International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. Daniel," 8 which held that the provisions of the Securities Act and Se-
curities Exchange Act are inapplicable to a noncontributory, compulsory
pension plan. Among the questions still facing the Court are: whether the
independent directors of a mutual fund registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940219 have the power to foreclose a nonfrivolous deriv-
ative suit against the majority directors of the fund and its investment ad-
viser;220 whether section 17 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193422
209. 43 Fed. Reg. 21,660, 21,661 (1978).
210. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979)
(No. 78-759).
211. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m(d), (e) (1971 & Supp. 1972-1977); 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78n(d)-(f)
(1971).
212. 577 F.2d at 1279, 1286.
213. 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978), petition for cert filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3766 (U.S. June i,
1978) (No. 77-1717).
214. 566 F.2d at 1243. The antifraud section of the Investment Advisers Act is codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
215. Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Trans-
america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 99 S. Ct. 348 (1978) (No. 77-1645).
216. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
217. 47 U.S.L.W. 4079 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 77-1305).
218. 47 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1979) (Nos. 77-753 and 77-754).
219. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-I to -52 (1971 & Supp. 1978).
220. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 75 (1978) (No. 77-
1724).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1976).
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creates an implied right of action against an accounting firm that prepares
a misleading report of a broker's financial affairs;222 and whether a fraud
perpetrated on brokers who are intermediaries in securities transactions,
and not investors, can be found to violate section 17(a)(1) of the Securities
Act of 1933.223
One development anticipated during the coming year may eventually
prove to have an enormous impact on securities regulation. Before the end
of 1979, Congress is expected to begin consideration of the proposed Fed-
eral Securities Code, which was approved by the American Law Institute
at its last annual meeting. If enacted, the Code will integrate the six inter-
related federal securities statutes into a single piece of legislation in an
attempt to simplify the law, eliminate duplicate regulation, and increase
the efficiency of the entire scheme of investor protection.224
222. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 46 U.S.L.W. 2598 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3360 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1978) (No. 78-309).
223. United States v. Naftalin, 579 F.2d 444 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3402
(U.S. Dec. 12, 1978) (No. 78-561).
224. The Introduction to the proposed Code is reproduced at ['78 Decisionsl FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 81,563.
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